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WHEN President Coolidge appointed Judge Swan to the Second Cir-
cuit, it was in some sense an act of faith. It is true that, as dean of the
Yale Law School for more than ten years, he had shown uncommon
talents as a leader and a teacher; that under him the school went for-
ward as it never had before in an equal time; and that he had shown
rare breadth of mind in the appointment cf men who radically differed
from his own views. However, the school had taken up all his time and
allowed him no access to courts; and his earlier practice in Chicago-
whither he went directly after he had finished his education-had been
almost exclusively in chambers. Thus, when he became a judge, his
acquaintance with courts had been very largely at second hand; and
indeed, so-far as concerns the actual trial of causes, such it remains to-
day. It would have been easy, therefore, to assume that such a man,
put on an appellate court, would prove to be more a scholar remote
from practical affairs and given to speculation, than a judge who would
be interested primarily in the just despatch of causes, and who would
make no further excursions into the realm of theory than was necessary
to support his decisions. Moreover, in 1927 it had not become as com-
mon as it now is to look to the schools to fill the bench; the tradition
had not so much yielded that the law should grow by accretion, each
step preparing for the next, and that courts should be jealous of at-
tempts to lay down doctrines of wide generality. A legal theorist was
the last kind of judge whom President Coolidge would have consciously
chosen; and, in spite of the possibilities I have mentioned, it at once
became evident that he had made no mistake, and that his act of faith
had been justified. There had come to the court a judge, not given to
remoulding the world nearer to the heart's desire, but one who sought
in the body of our inherited law and in the statutes, those guides and
directions which were to be both his limitations and his opportunities.
On the other hand it also soon appeared that, although he was a "legal"
judge in the sense I have just mentioned, he regarded the law, not as
a set of fiats to be read literally, and rigidly applied to all occasions em-
braced within the words and only to those; but as the means of fulfill-
ing the purposes of a living society, which could be comprehended only
as they were step by step realized.
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In temper and bearing he was transparently made for the office. His
manners on the bench were, and are, a model; and-be it said in all
humility-often an admonition to others whose composure is not
equally proof against irritation. He speaks but little, and is no "ill-
tuned cymbal"; he never seeks to bring out in advance what will ap-
pear in season; nor does he lead the argument far afield into pastures
whence the return is tortuous and uncertain. When he does speak, it
is to put a narrow question, directed to inconsistencies already appar-
ent, or to the untoward consequences of that which has been said. He
is never in the teacher's chair, nor does he drive counsel to confusion
by successive advances, designed to end in rout. His urbanity is almost
always unruffled; never, in an experience with him of over twenty years,
have I known him to hector a lawyer, or abuse the advantage of his
position which denies any retort in kind. He has as little of the bully
as of the showman, and he has reaped from the bar the harvest which
his courteous and considerate nature has sown. Not that he suffers
fools gladly, or is ready to let those wander along who think that they
shall be heard for their much speaking. To direct, and if necessary to
curtail, argument seems to him as much a part of the judge's duty, as
to listen; and listen he always does; or, at least he gives the appearance
of listening, for he never adopts the not uncommon device of discour-
aging prosy advocates by a real, or assumed, show of contemptuous in-
attention. In conference he is open-minded, until he has heard what
his brothers have to say, which he considers with respect and at times
with too much deference; but, after he has once come to a conclusion,
he is tenacious and very seldom yields. He is little given to dissent,
being wholly without vanity, and-as it seems to me-not conscious
enough of the importance of weakening the force of a wrong decision
as a precedent. He is readier than most judges to take seriously peti-
tions for rehearing (especially if he has written the opinion himself);
not indeed, because of vacillation or of any shrinking from responsi-
bility, but from an over tender scruple, coupled with entire absence of
any pride of opinion. Incidentally, I have however, never observed that
he, more often than other judges, votes to change the original result.
On the other hand he is always ready to accept suggestion from his
brothers in amending or even in rewriting his opinions, before they are
handed down, if he agrees with the substance of the proposal. He will
not overrule a precedent, unless he can be satisfied beyond peradven-
ture that it was untenable when made; and not even then, if it has gath-
ered around it the support of a substantial body of decisions based upon
it. As a corollary, he is not given to wide commitments when he writes,
for he distrusts the guidance which the present evidence and the pre-
sent argument give, if the issues be amplified beyond what is necessary
to dispose of the controversy. He believes that the industry of other
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suitors to whom they may become vital, if expanded, is likely further
to explore and illuminate them. Consistently with this, he does not seek
to support his conclusions by resort to broad or speculative general
principles; but, like an English judge, looks to the precedents or to the
text for his warrant.
He finds his way through thickets of verbiage in statutes or regula-
tions with more ease than any other judge of my personal acquaintance.
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for ex-
ample, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-
reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in ab-
stract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only
a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed,
purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power,
if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that
these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plug-
ging up this hole and casting out that net, against all possible evasion;
yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about
certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a pas-
sion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the
reader they have any significance save that the words are strung to-
gether with syntactical correctness. Much of the law is now as difficult
to fathom, and more and more of it is likely to be so; for there is little
doubt that we are entering a period of increasingly detailed regulation,
and it will be the duty of judges to thread the path-for path there is
-through these fantastic labyrinths. Any facility in doing so is of the
utmost importance; I envy its possessors, among whom my brother
stands in the front rank. Again and again I have found myself utterly
bewildered by the involution of phrase with phrase and of term with
term, until his kindly light showed the turn which I had missed, and
led ine out of what had appeared to be a cul de sac. The talent, which
can keep in solution, at whatever cost, these many ingredients and
carry them all over into a final precipitate, is rare enough; but the
talent which can do so without hours of distress and confusion is vouch-
safed to only a scanty few.
His style is also a judicial model; simple, clear, severe, trimmed of
ornament. He never seeks a display of learning, or a locution or phrase
designed to divert his reader's attention from the substance he would
convey, and to centre it upon himself; and in this he is protected, as
few indeed of us are protected, by as complete an absence of any de-
sire to startle and impress others with his endowments, as I have known
on the bench or off. His propositions are well fortified by citation, and,
in doubtful cases, he will exhaust the books before he is content with
the result. An amusing instance of this was his opinion in what proved
later to be the revolutionary case of Brie Railroad Company v. Tomp-
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kins. That involved a tort committed in Pennsylvania, whose common-
law on thp point was different from the great body of decisions else-
where. At first we were going to follow the Pennsylvania decisions for
we did not know the others, and the briefs-as is so often the case-
were inadequate. After much delving he found that, if we were to ap-
ply the "general law"-as we were then bound to do in a "diversity
case"-the Pennsylvania rule did not govern; and so we held and were
reversed by the epoch-making volte face of the Supreme Court. Had
it not been for his hypertrophied judicial conscience, who shall say that
we might not still be worshipping the Golden Calf of Swift v. Tyson?
In addition he has--so far as it is given to any of us to have it-
that merit which perhaps should rank highest in point of style: i.e.
not to be misled into assuming the conclusion in the minor premiss-
not to beg the question. I can think of no single fault that has done
more to confuse the law and to disseminate litigation. One would sup-
pose that so transparent a logical vice would be easily detected; but
the offenders pass in troops before our eyes, bearing great names and
distinguished titles. The truth is that we are all sinners; nobody's re-
cord is clean; and indeed it is only fair to say that much of the very
texture of the law invites us to sin, for it so often holds out to us, as
though they were objective standards, terms like "reasonable care,"
"due notice," "reasonable restraint," which are no more than signals
that the dispute is to be decided with moderation and without disre-
gard of any of the interests at stake. So inveterate is the disposition
to eschew all deduction in such cases, that some ironist might argue
that, given the average judicial capacity for self-scrutiny, it is safer not
to expose the springs of decision, because the chances of a right result
are greater than that its support will endure disclosure. Perhaps so;
maybe, for the ingenuous and the artless to beg the question is nature's
self-protective artifice. That need not be answered; but as a conscious
expedient it would corrupt. Besides, few of us would care to avow that
the law prospers only in proportion as those who administer it know not
what they do; or that to use its language with full understanding of
its purport, will not in the end promote its progress.
So much then for manners, acumen, and style. These count for much
in a judge; far more than often we are prepared to admit; but, when
all is said, the real test is how truly does he interpret law. Even as far
back as Aristotle judicial interpretation was seen as an essential in the
structure of a civilized society;' but it has vexed men from the begin-
ning and will continue to vex them till the end, how far the occasion
1. "It is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for
enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars." (Politics:
Book II fol. 1269(a)). "Some things can, and some things cannot be comprehended
under the law, and this is the origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the
best man should rule. For matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be in-
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which provoked an "enactment,"-to adopt his term-and the pur-
pose which infused it-be it constitution, statute, precedent or regula-
tion-shall prevail to set its limits, or to enlarge its comprehension.
This is not the place to attempt an answer-perhaps there is none any-
way-; it is enough that, whatever it is, in any event it must always
be ad hoc. It is true that in archaic societies law, which is usually it-
self a sacred text, is read, like other primitive sacred texts, to cover
every situation which falls within the exact content of the words, and
to exclude every situation which does not. But as soon as a society
becomes conscious of self-direction, it begins to apply in some measure
a "literary"canon-to borrow from Matthew Arnold-: that is, it be-
gins to read the text, not sub specie aeternitalis; but with the recollec-
tion that in origin it served to compose some existing conflict of interest,
and that this should serve to interpret it. The extent to which such
societies permit their judges to do this is the extent of their confidence
in them: more properly, in modem times at any rate, the measure of
their own confidence that they can trust themselves to select those
on whose skill and sagacity they are willing to rely. There are indeed
political philosophers who insist that a judge must inevitably choose
between the dictionary and tabula rasa; but there is a plain distinction
in theory between "interpretation" and "legislation," as well as a clear
boundary in practise. Let the judge go as far afield as he will, in seek-
ing the meaning of an "enactment"; if he is honest, he will never sub-
stitute his personal appraisal of the interests at stake, or his personal
preference between them. It is true that he is not engaged in a histor-
ical reconstruction, as he is when determining an issue of fact; his task
is more difficult, so difficult that it is impossible ever to know how far
he has been successful. For it is no less than to decide how those who
have passed the "enactment" would have dealt with the "particulars"
before him, about which they have said nothing whatever. Impalpable
and even insoluble as that inquiry may be, the method which he must
pursue is toto coelo different from that open to him, were he free to en-
force his own choices.
What then are the qualities, mental and moral, which best serve a
judge to discharge this perilous but inescapable duty? First, he must
be aware of the difficulty and the hazard. He must hesitate long before
imputing more to the "enactment" than he finds in the words, remem-
bering that the "policy" of any law may inhere as much in its limits
as in its extent. He must hesitate long before cutting down their literal
effect, remembering that the authors presumably said no more than
they wanted. He must have the historical capacity to reconstruct the
whole setting which evoked the law; the contentions which it resolved;
cluded in legislation. Nor does anyone deny that the decision in such matters must be
left to man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not one only."
(Politics, Book III foL 1287(b) ).
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the objects which it sought; the events which led up to it. But all this
is only the beginning, for he must possess the far more exceptional
power of divination which can peer into the purpose beyond its expres-
sion, and bring to fruition that which lay only in flower. Of the moral
qualities necessary to this, before and beyond all, he must purge his
mind and will of those personal presuppositions and prejudices which
almost inevitably invade all human judgments; he must approach his
problems with as little preconception of what shohld bie the outcome
as it is given to men to have; in short, the prime condition of his suc-
cess will be his capacity for detachment. There are those who insist
that detachment is an illusion; that our conclusions, when their bases
are sifted, always reveal a passional foundation. Even so; though
they be throughout the creatures of past emotional experience, it does
not follow that that experience can never predispose us to impartiality.
A bias against bias may be as likely a result of some buried crisis, as
any other bias. Be that as it may, we know that men do differ widely
in this capacity; and the incredulity which seeks to discredit that
knowledge is a part of the crusade against reason from which we have
already so bitterly suffered. We may deny-and, if we are competent
observers, we will deny-that no one can be aware of the danger and
in large measure provide against it.
My brother is not a man of neutral disposition, but of strong convic-
tions resolutely held; he might be thought likely to allow these to enter
into his judicial decisions. I will not say that any of us is without all
tincture of such interjections; but he stands among those who are most
completely fiee. In support of this I could adduce the overwhelming
testimony of bench and bar, familiar with him and his work. They find
in him a rectitude, which goes far beyond the elimination of all personal
interest or concern; a rectitude which ignores his own beliefs and his
own inclinations, and seeks for its sanction an authority, more com-
manding than the authority of himself or any other man-the author-
ity of the collective will of a people, manifesting itself in their accred-
ited declarations, as they strive, however blindly and inarticulately, to-
wards their conception of the Good Life. To that authority alone he
owns allegiance; and without stint and without alloy he has given him-
self to ascertain and to realize that conception. This he has done with
patience, courage, insight, self-effacement, understanding, imagination
and learning; and his success has been an achievement equalled by only
a handful, It is well that we should seize upon a moment, in itself ir-
relevant, on which to celebrate an anniversary of such a public servant.
We are aware that today the foundations of all that we hold dear are
in the balance; and we live in just apprehension. Without such servants
no society can prosper; without such servants no society can in the end
even endure. Let us pause then to acclaim one, who-himself all un-
aware of his deserts-has so richly earned our gratitude, and whose
presence helps us to take heart against our forebodings.
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